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FROM LOVING MOTHER TO WELFARE QUEEN TO DRUG ADDICT?
LEBRON V. SECRETARY OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES AND THE EVOLVING PUBLIC VIEW OF THE POOR AS
A CLASS OF SUB-HUMANS WITH SUB-RIGHTS
Nikita McMillian *
I. INTRODUCTION
"Don't Feed the Alligators!"I Those were the words that occupied the sign
held by Florida's Congressional Representative John Mica during a 1995 House
debate concerning welfare reform.2 Comparing welfare recipients to alligators,
Representative Mica's sign exemplified how some in the public had come to
perceive the poor as a class of dangerous sub-humans3 who must be eyed with
suspicion.
The labeling of welfare beneficiaries as sub-human, dangerous, or
deserving of suspicion was not always the public view. Welfare programs were
initially constructed to help poor, widowed mothers care for their children.4
Initially the beneficiaries were depicted as mothers who were just trying to stay
* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Mississippi College School of Law. A loving thank you to all of my
family and friends who have been an unwavering source of support. A very special thanks to Professor Angela
Mae Kupenda for her guidance, motivation, and resourcefulness while completing this Note.
1. House Session, (C-Span television broadcast March 24, 1995), http://www.c-
span.org/video/?64184-1/house-session&personid=26160 (statement of Rep. Mica). Florida representative
John Mica dehumanized welfare recipients in his advocating for reform of the federal welfare system in 1995:
I represent Florida where we have many lakes and natural reserves. If you visit these areas, you
may see a sign like this that reads, 'do not feed the alligators.' We post these signs for several
reasons. First, because if left in a natural state, alligators can fend for themselves. They work,
gather food and care for their young. Second, we post these warnings because unnatural feeding
and artificial care creates dependency. When dependency sets in, these otherwise able-bodied
alligators can no longer survive on their own. Now, I know people are not alligators, but I submit
to you that with our current handout, non-work welfare system, we have upset the natural order.
We have failed to understand the simple warning signs. We have created a system of
dependency....
141 Cong. Rec. 3766 (1995) (statement of Rep. John Mica).
2. House Session, supra note 1.
3. While expressing her view on the failure of the federal welfare system as it was in 1995, Wyoming
Representative Barbara Cubin compared welfare recipients to wolves:
My home State is Wyoming, and recently the Federal Government introduced wolves into the
State of Wyoming, and they put them in pens and they brought elk and venison to them every
day. This is what I call the wolf welfare program. The Federal Government introduced them and
they have since then provided shelter and they have provided food, they have provided everything
that the wolves need for their existence. Guess what? They opened the gate to let the wolves out
and now the wolves will not go. . . . What has happened with e wolves, just like what happens
with human beings, when you take away their incentives, when you take away their freedom,
when you take away their dignity, they have to be provided for.
141 Cong. Rec. 3772 (1995) (statement of Rep. Barbara Cubin).
4. Karryn Gustafson, Criminal Law: The Criminalization ofPoverty, 99 J CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 643,
648 (2009) (citing BARBARA J. NELSON, THE ORIGINS OF THE TwO-CHANNEL WELFARE STATE: WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION AND MOTHER'S AID, IN WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 124 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990).
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home so they could take care of their families5- an applauded calling for White
mothers.6 These welfare programs were thus tailored to the White mother and
her children, as impoverished Black women and their children were largely
excluded as beneficiaries of such programs.7 Hence, initial public opinion of the
deserving beneficiaries of state and federal aid programs bears a sharp contrast to
the prevailing view of welfare beneficiaries that we have come to know today.8
As more Black mothers were included as welfare beneficiaries, the public
view of these welfare recipients deteriorated. Beginning with the "welfare
queen" rhetoric of the seventies and eighties,9 racialized stereotypes of these
welfare mothers dehumanized them. The images-painting welfare recipients as
Black female criminals misusing the aid and cheating the community-played a
substantial role in the shaping of the negative public opinion about welfare
beneficiaries as we know it today.10
5. See Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals,
102 YALE L.J. 719, 723 (1992). According to legislators, Aid to Dependent Children was "designed to release
from the wage-earning role the person whose natural function is to give her children the physical and
affectionate guardianship necessary, not alone to keep them from falling into social misfortune, but more
affirmatively to rear them into citizens capable of contributing to society." Id. at 746 n.32 (quoting Economic
Security Act: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means on HR. 4120, 74th Cong. 48 (1935)).
6. As stated by former Supreme Court Justice Joseph Bradley, "The natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . . The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother."
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (upholding the constitutional validity of a statute barring women
from practicing law) (Bradley, J. concurring). But this attitude of romantic paternalism did not apply to
society's conception of black motherhood. See Frances Dana Gage, Sojouner Truth, Ain't I a Woman? (May
29, 1851), in ANTI SLAVERY STANDARD, May 1863, http://www.sojournertruth.org/Library/Speeches/AintIA
Woman.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2016).
7. Premilla Nadasen, From Widow to 'Welfare Queen": Welfare and the Politics of Race, BLACK
WOMEN, GENDER, AND FAMILIES 52, 55 (2007); Gustafson, supra note 4 at 648.
8. See e.g., Lucy Madison, Fact-checking Romney's "47 %" Comment, CBS NEWS (Sept. 25, 2012,
10:57 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fact-checking-romneys-47-%-comment/ (Republican presidential
candidate Mitt Romney referred to the poor as "47 % . . . who are dependent on government, who believe that
they are victims, who believe the government has a responsibility to care for them, who believe that they are
entitled to health care, to food, to housing . . . . These are the people who pay no income tax."); Representative
and former Republican Vice Presidential candidate Paul Ryan stated:
We have got this tailspin of culture, in our inner cities in particular, of men not working and just
generations of men not even thinking about working or learning the value and culture of work,
and so there is a real culture problem here that has to be dealt with.
Jason Sattler, No, Paul Ryan Doesn't Deserve the Benefit of the Doubt, HUFFINGTON POST
BLOG (March 16, 2014, 8:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-sattler/paul-
ryan b_4974233.html.
9. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 653. The welfare queen is a stereotype used by politicians and the like to
portray welfare recipients as lazy women of color who live extravagant lifestyles due to abuse and misuse of
government assistance. Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 247, 257 (2014); see Nadasen, supra note 7 at 53 ("Ronald Regan employed it in the 1980s to
demonize women on welfare . . . ."). The anecdotal welfare queen of the 1970s was influenced by Linda
Taylor, a black woman convicted of welfare fraud. See "Welfare Queen " Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1976, at 51.
10. See generally Gustafson, supra note 4. Florida's Governor, Rick Scott, stated that "it is unfair for
Florida's taxpayers to subsidize drug addiction." Press Release, Rick Scott, Governor of Fla., Governor Scott
Fulfills Campaign Promise to Require Drug Screening for Welfare Recipients (May 31, 2011),
http://www.flgov.com/2011/06/03/governor-scott-fulfills-campaign-promise-to-require-drug-screening-for-
welfare-recipients/. Consistent with Governor Scott's perception of the poor, Missouri Representative Ellen
Brandon asserted that "We should discourage drug use and not reward it." Martin Karamra, Drug Testing
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This negative public opinion is evident in many laws presently proposed by
States. The current nationwide proposals for mandatory drug testing of
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF")"I recipients are an exact
illustration and manifestation of the negative public views of today's TANF
beneficiaries. The drug testing requirement suggests that the TANF recipients
are dangerous drug addicts and deserving of the public's and Government's
suspicion. This public view has evolved detrimentally and is a long way from the
initial sympathetic view held of White widowed mothers trying to stay home and
raise their children.
This Note focuses on the judicial consideration of legislation in Florida
which seems premised on the public and governmental view that TANF
beneficiaries are typically drug users and inherently deserving of suspicion rather
than assistance. Florida's mandatory drug testing legislation for TANF
recipients is at the forefront of Lebron v. Secretary of Florida Department of
Children and Families,12 an Eleventh Circuit case and the topic of this Note. In
Lebron II,13 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
a grant of a permanent injunction against Florida's suspicionless, mandatory
drug testing of TANF applicants.14 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit held that
Florida's mandated drug testing regime under Florida Statute section 414.065215
violated the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment's16 protection
against unreasonable searches.17
The Fourth Amendment typically requires a search to be based on some
form of individualized suspicion in order to be deemed reasonable.18 An
exception is warranted under the special needs doctrine when there are "special
needs, beyond the normal need of law enforcement, which make the requirement
of [individualized suspicion] impracticable."'9 The Eleventh Circuit's ruling
expressly recognized that Florida had not demonstrated a substantial special need
Welfare Recipients, CBS (Apr. 13, 2011), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2011/04/13/drug-testing-welfare-
recipients/.
11. TANF is a block grant program that was implemented by Congress as part of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act ("PRWOA") on August 22, 1996. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2012); Lebron
v. Wilkins (Wilkins 1), 820 Supp. 2d 1273, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2011). Through the TANF program, federal grants
are offered to States to aid "needy families with short term financial assistance and with finding employment.
Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron l), 71 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2013); see 42
U.S.C. §601(a).
12. Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron II), 772 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2014).
13. This term will be used to refer to the topic case in a short citation form. This Note addresses the
ruling inLebronI. The first case, Lebronv. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron l), 710 F.3d
1202 (11th Cir. 2013), will be discussed later in the procedural history and will be referred to as Lebron I.
14. Lebron II, 772 F.3d at 1378.
15. The statute provides that "[tihe [Department of Children and Families] shall require drug test ... to
screen each individual who applies for [TANF]." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.0652(1) (West 2014). Further, "The
department shall provide notice of drug testing to each individual at the time of application. The notice must
advise the individual that drug testing will be conducted as a condition of receiving TANF benefits. . . ." Id. §
414.0652(2)(a).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. Lebron II, 772 F.3d at 1378.
18. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
19. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
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warranting exemption from the Fourth Amendment's suspicion requirement.20
Implicitly, and as discussed below, the Circuit Court's ruling suggests that public
and governmental opinions about welfare beneficiaries are based solely on
stereotypes. The Circuit Court refused to uphold the Florida law signifying that
TANF recipients as a group are automatically deserving of being treated as
suspected drug users without evidence of such.
Part II of this Note provides a factual summary and procedural history of
the instant case. As will be demonstrated, even the facts regarding this particular
TANF applicant challenge the former public opinions of welfare beneficiaries as
deserving White mothers or as welfare queens. Further, the facts in the instant
case challenge the present public opinions of welfare beneficiaries as drug addict
sub-humans. Part III gives a historical overview of the welfare system in the
United States, explaining how stereotypes of race and class formed the nation's
view of the poor today. These negative views are reflected in laws and policies,
such as in the Florida law, which is the subject of this Note. This Part also
thoroughly explains prior case law that is relevant to the instant case. While this
Note refutes the reasonableness of suspicionless drug testing for TANF
beneficiaries, in cases such as Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association,2 1 National Treasury Employers' Union v. Von Raab,22 Veronia
School District 47J v. Acton,23 and Board of Education v. Earls,24 the United
States Supreme Court upheld the reasonableness of suspicionless drug testing
within the context of inherently dangerous employment and within the school
setting. But significantly, Chandler v. Miller25-to which the Circuit Court
likened the topic case-invalidated the suspicionless drug testing of state
candidates for public office.
Part IV of this Note discusses the majority and concurring opinions in the
instant case, assessing how the Circuit Court arrived at its holding. Looking to
the benchmark cases mentioned above, the Circuit Court unanimously
determined that Florida failed to demonstrate the existence of substantial special
needs to justify its mandatory suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants and
declared section 414.0652 unconstitutional.26
In Part V the writer goes beyond the Circuit Court's reasoning, providing
analytical insight on the main issues of the case and society's public opinion of
the poor. The Circuit Court directly held Florida could not require mandatory,
suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants as the State had not demonstrated
a substantial special need warranting exemption from the Fourth Amendment's
suspicion requirement.27 This Note argues that the Circuit Court is correct
because no such special need exists to justify suspicionless drug testing of TANF
20. Lebron II, 772 F.3d at 1378.
21. 489 U.S. 602.
22. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
23. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
24. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
25. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
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applicants. Rather, what is special is the Government's refusal to recognize data
establishing that welfare recipients do not abuse drugs any more than the general
population.2 8 This Note asserts that ideas about race, gender, and class are the
driving force behind such drug testing laws. Fortunately, the Circuit Court
rejected Florida's argument that TANF applicants were more suspicious of drug
use than the general population.29 The State's proof was indeed lacking, as the
basis for the governmental requirement of suspicionless testing was not
grounded in evidence of actual suspicion, rather it was based on stereotypes of
welfare beneficiaries. What is more, the public's and the State's dehumanizing
views about the poor have now resulted in their diminished rights.
Finally, Part VI concludes by briefly summarizing the highlights of the
writer's thesis and analysis. The writer leaves the reader with additional
questions to consider as the country's poor increase in number30 and as the
country's policies toward the poor continue to evolve. As a remedy the writer
urges courts, especially the United States Supreme Court, to forthrightly address
the effects that factually inaccurate racial, gender, and class stereotyping has on
the Fourth Amendment rights of the nation's poor and the development of our
laws.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The issue in this case is simple: whether Florida is justified in conducting
mandatory drug testing of welfare beneficiaries without individualized
suspicion.3 1 The facts and the procedural history make this simple question and
this Part more complicated for two reasons. First, the applicant in the instant
case does not fit into the stereotyped past or present public views of welfare
recipients. Second, this case was considered by the Circuit Court twice. This
Part will be divided into three sections to help explain how a simple question
generated such complexity.
A. Who is the TANF Applicant Named Luis Lebron?
In July 2011, Luis Lebron3 2-an honorably discharged veteran,33 college
28. Prior to enacting Florida Statute section 414.0652, Florida's Department of Children & Families
implemented the Demonstration Project to test "whether TANF applicants were likely to abuse illegal drugs
and whether that abuse affected employment opportunities." Id. at 1366. The study revealed that only 335
individuals tested positive out of the 1,447 tested 5.2% of 6,462 total individuals screened. Id. at 1366.
During the four months that the State enforced section 414.0652, only 2.67 percent of TANF applicants tested
positive for illicit drug use in Florida. Id. at 1367. However, "Florida has an illegal drug use rate of 8%."
Darlena Cunha, Why Drug Testing Welfare Recipients is a Waste of Taxpayer Money, TIME (Aug. 15, 2014),
http://time.com/3117361/welfare-recipients-drug-testing/. This data demonstrates that Florida's TANF
population abuses drugs at a far less rate than those in the general population. Id.; see also John Couwels,
Federal Judge Temporarily Bars Florida's Welfare Drug-test Law, CNN (Oct. 25, 2011, 10:08 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/25/us/florida-welfare-drug-tests/index.html.
29. Lebron II, 772 F.3d at 1378.
30. See Hope Yen, U.S. Poverty on Track to Rise to Highest Since 1960s, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22,
2012, 8:46 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/22/us-poverty-level-1960s n_1692744.html.
31. See generally Lebron II, 772 F.3d 1352.
32. For a picture of Luis Lebron, see Rachel Bloom, The Daily Show Tells Florida Legislators: "I
Think I'm Gonna Need You to Pee into this Cup," ACLU (Feb. 03, 2012, 12:09 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform-racial-justice/daily-show-tells-florida-legislators-i-think-im-
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student,34 and single father35 to his young son36-applied for financial
assistance benefits for himself and his child through Florida's TANF program.37
In addition to caring for his son and himself, Lebron was also responsible for
caring for his disabled mother, with whom he lived.38 A full-time student
majoring in accounting at the University of Central Florida,39 Lebron found
himself surviving off of student loans and grants after his veteran's benefits
terminated.40 Lebron's gender and other characteristics, therefore, defied the
general stereotypes about welfare beneficiaries.
Further, Lebron did not stand to become rich or to live a lavish lifestyle
from the monetary welfare benefits.41 If eligible for TANF benefits, he and his
son would have received only a maximum of $241 per month in cash assistance
under Florida's TANF program.42  Still, he needed the assistance so he
applied.43 Upon applying, Lebron was informed that he would be required to
submit to a mandatory drug test as a final condition of eligibility, in accordance
with newly enacted Florida Statute section 414.0652.44 He was notified that he
had to sign a release consenting to the test before the Department of Children
and Families ("DCF") would allow him to continue with the application
process.4 5 Lebron signed the release and met all of the eligibility requirements
of the TANF program, but was denied benefits because he refused to submit to
the mandatory, suspicionless drug testing.46 Later, Lebron filed suit and initially
sought a preliminary injunction.47
gonna-need.
33. In 2010, veterans constituted approximately 9.5% of the 18 and older population in the United
States; however, they "comprised 13% of sheltered homeless adults." U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEV., VETERAN HOMELESSNESS: A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO THE 2010 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT
REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2010). "[A] 2014 Point-in-Time count revealed that there were approximately 49,933
homeless [v]eterans on a single night in January 2014 in the United States." U.S. DEP'T. OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/HOMELESS/abouttheinitiative.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
34. See Alemayehu Bishaw, When Off-Campus College Students are Excluded, Poverty Rates Fall in
Many College Towns, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 29, 2013), http://blogs.census.gov/2013/07/29/when-off-
campus-college-students-are-excluded-poverty-rates-fall-in-many-college-towns/, for discussion of poverty
rate amongst college students living off campus from 2009 to 2011.
35. See GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEwRESEARCH CENTER, THE RISE OF SINGLE FATHERS: A NINEFOLD
INCREASE SINCE 1960 5-6 (2013), for statistics on single fathers living below the poverty line.
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.'S, INFORMATION ON POVERTY AND INCOME
STATISTICS: A SUMMARY OF 2012 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY DATA 4 (2012) which indicates that the
"child poverty rate was 21.9%" in 2011).
37. Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron II), 772 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir.
2014).
38. Id.
39. Kevin Wolkenfeld, UCF Student Luis Lebron, ACLU Sue Florida Over Gov. Scott's Welfare Drug
Tests, KNIGHTNEWS.COM (Sept. 7, 2011, 6:37 PM), http://knightnews.com/2011/09/ucf-student-luis-lebron-
aclu-sue-florida-over-gov-scotts-welfare-drug-tests/.
40. Maria Kayanan, Victory in Florida: No Illegal Drug Testing For Welfare, ACLU (Oct. 25, 2011,
5:07 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/victory-florida-no-illegal-drug-testing-welfare.
41. See Lebron II, 772 F.3d at 1356.
42. Id.




47. Id. at 1357-58.
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B. Lebron I: Preliminary Injunction against Florida's Mandatory, Suspicionless
Drug Testing of TANF Applicants
Lebron filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida challenging Florida's mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of
TANF applicants as a violation of his and all other applicants' Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and sought to enjoin the DCF
from enforcing the statute.4 8 He argued that a preliminary injunction was
necessary to prevent the irreparable harm that would be caused to him and other
TANF applicants.49 In response, the State contended the following: section
414.0652's requirement that TANF applicants consent to a drug test does not
constitute a search within the Fourth Amendment; the mandatory suspicionless
drug testing is justified by the State's special needs to conduct drug testing
within the realm of TANF funds; Lebron would not suffer irreparable harm
because he is free to refuse the drug test; and there is a public interest in
guaranteeing that public funds are used for their intended purpose and not in
ways that will endanger the public.5 0
The district court ruled in favor of Lebron.5 1  Addressing the State's
contention that drug testing under section 414.0652 does not constitute a search,
the district court noted that the "Supreme Court has routinely treated urine
samples taken by state agents as searches within the Fourth Amendment,"
regardless of an individual's opportunity to refuse.52 In light of this precedent
and "the inherently investigative character of the drug test," the district court
rejected the State's argument that drug testing did not constitute a search.53
Continuing to argue that such suspicionless drug tests are justifiable under the
Fourth Amendment, the State maintained that he following proffered interests
are special needs:
(1) ensuring that TANF funds are used for their dedicated purpose, and not
diverted to drug use; (2) protecting children by ensuring that its funds are not
used to visit an "evil" upon the children's homes and families; (3) ensuring that
funds are not used in a manner that detracts from the goal of getting beneficiaries
back to employment; (4) ensuring that the government does not fund the "public
health risk" posed by the crime associated with the "drug epidemic."54
The district court awarded Lebron the preliminary injunction he sought,
finding no competent evidence in the record to support the State's proffered
interests nor the conclusion that drug use is a concrete danger among TANF
recipients.5 5  The court determined that the State had not demonstrated a
substantial special need to justify the suspicionless drug testing of all TANF
48. Id.
49. Lebron v. Wilkins (Wilkinsl), 820 Supp. 2d 1273, 1281 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1293.
52. Id. at 1282-83.1283 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); Veronia
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Nat'l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)).
53. Id. at 1283.
54. Id. at 1286.
55. Id. at 1286-92.
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applicants.56 In doing so, the court concluded that Lebron had "shown a
"substantial likelihood of success on the merits" of his claim.57
Further, the district court found that Lebron had shown that subjecting him,
as well as all who were similarly situated, to suspicionless drug testing as a
condition for receiving TANF benefits would cause irreparable harm due to the
potential violation to the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches.58  In addition, the district court held that issuing a preliminary
injunction to protect against a likely violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of
TANF applicants serves the public interest and outweighs the minimal harm that
would be caused to the State by the injunction.59 As a result of the foregoing
findings, the district court granted a preliminary injunction against the State's
enforcement of Florida Statute section 414.0652.60
Subsequently, the State appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.6 1 On appeal, the
only issue presented by the State was a challenge to the district court's finding
that Lebron had shown a "substantial likelihood of success on the merits" of his
claim that Florida's mandatory suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants
violates the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches.62
The case was heard in this first appearance in the Eleventh Circuit by Judge
Rosemary Barkett,63 Judge Adalberto Jordan,64 and Judge James Randal Hall.65
This panel of judges unanimously affirmed the district court's decision, holding
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by granting a preliminary
injunction against the State's enforcement of Florida Statute section 414.0652.66
The Eleventh Circuit based this holding on its conclusion that the State failed to
demonstrate a substantial special need to support its mandatory suspicionless
drug testing of TANF applicants.67 In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1292.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1293.
60. Id. The court denied the request for a class certification without prejudice due the State's stipulation
that it would "apply the ruling to all persons similarly situated to [Lebron]." Id.
61. Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron 1), 710 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir.
2013).
62. Id. at 1206.
63. Appointed by President Bill Clinton in 1994, Judge Rosemary was the first woman to serve as chief
justice on the Florida Supreme Court prior to her appointment. WORLD HERITAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.worldheritage.org/articles/Rosemary Barkett (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
64. Judge Jordan served as a United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida prior to
being appointed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals by President Obama in 2012. See U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, http://www.cal l.uscourts.gov/judges/hon-adalberto-jordan (last visited
Jan. 11, 2015).
65. Judge Hall, a United States District Judge for the Southern District of Georgia appointed by
President George W. Bush in 2008, sat by designation on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Lebron I,
710 F.3d at 1205; Tom Campbell, Augusta Attorney Becomes Judge, WRDW (April 11, 2008, 5:55 PM),
http://www.wrdw.com/home/headlines/17552179.html?site=mobile.
66. Lebron I, 710 F.3d at 1218.
67. Id. Because the Eleventh Circuit found that the State failed to establish a substantial special need
for its mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants, it did not deem it necessary to weigh any
competing governmental interests. Id.
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Circuit noted that the State's policy did not fit the two exceptional circumstances
that the United States Supreme Court has recognized as substantial special needs
justifying an exemption from the Fourth Amendment's individualized suspicion
requirement: "the specific risk to public safety by employees engaged in
inherently dangerous jobs and the protection of children entrusted to the public
school system's care and tutelage."6 8
Nevertheless, the State argued that drug use undermines the program's
goals of transitioning applicants into employment and promoting child welfare
and family stability.69 Thus, ensuring that TANF funds were not expended for
drug use was a substantial special need which justifies Florida's mandatory,
suspicionless drug testing of applicants.70  In rejecting this argument, the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the State failed to present any factual support or
empirical evidence of a concrete danger of illegal drug use within Florida's
population of TANF recipients.7 1 The only known shared characteristic among
the tested individuals was financial need, which the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned does not support the conclusion that there is a concrete danger
that such individuals are prone to drug use.72 Moreover, if drug use does occur,
there was no proof that the lives of TANF recipients are "fraught with such risks
of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous
consequences."7 3 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the State's
argument was based on a presumption of unlawful drug use among TANF
recipients.74 Likening the State's argument to that advanced by Georgia in
Chandler v. Miller75 , the Eleventh Circuit asserted that a State must provide
adequate factual support that substantiates the existence of a concrete danger in
order to establish a substantial special need that warrants abrogating an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights.76  The State's conjecture did not
suffice.77
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the State's alternative argument that the
search was constitutionally valid because the drug tests were only administered
after obtaining an individual's consent.7 8 By informing TANF applicants of
ineligibility upon refusal to consent, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the
individual's "consent" to drug testing "amounts to nothing more than
'submission to authority rather than ... an understanding and intentional waiver
of a constitutional right. "'79 Further, this mandated consent violated the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, which prohibits the government from denying a
68. Id. at 1207.
69. Id. at 1211.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1213.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1214.
79. Id. at 1215.
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benefit to an individual on grounds that encroach upon the individual's
constitutional rights.80 Thus, the Court held that the State could not indirectly
accomplish the suspicionless search by conditioning eligibility for TANF
benefits on an applicant's mandated "consent" to drug testing.8' Essentially,
such precondition compelled one to choose between desperately needed financial
assistance at the expense of abandoning Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches.82
Concluding that the State did not establish a substantial special need that
justified its mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
granting the preliminary injunction.83 The Eleventh Circuit denied the State's
petition for a rehearing en banc.84
C. Lebron II: Permanent Injunction against Florida's Mandatory, Suspicionless
Drug Testing of TANF Applicants
In the meantime, the parties had neglected to seek a stay of the preliminary
injunction in the district court pending appeal.85 Before the Eleventh Circuit
even issued its judgment on the matter, both parties filed summary judgment
motions with the district court.86 Following the Eleventh Circuit's decision
affirming the preliminary injunction order, the district court proceeded to
adjudicate the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment addressing the
facial validity of section 414.0652.87 Although the State's arguments asserting
its interests had been rejected by both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit
in Lebron I, the State still maintained, in Lebron II, that its interests constituted
substantial special needs which rendered the mandatory, suspicionless drug
testing of TANF applicants constitutional.88 Citing no supporting authority, the
State contended that the special needs exception applied because there was a
concern that a drug use problem existed among TANF applicants.89 Expressing
80. Id. at 1217. Although the Circuit Court discussed the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in
Lebron I, the Circuit Court did not focus its analysis on the doctrine in the topic case. The doctrine has been
recognized since Bailey v. Alabama, in which the plaintiff was charged under an Alabama statute which
criminally punished a person who entered a contract with one's employer and failed to perform services after
receiving compensation. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 227-29 (1911). The statute created a presumption
that the plaintiff did so with the intent to injure or defraud his employer. Id. Upon conviction, the plaintiff was
required to refund the payment or be sentenced to labor for the employer in lieu of the fine. Id. at 231. As it
was clear that the State could not "punish the [individual] as a criminal for the mere failure or refusal to serve
without paying his debt, [the Court held] it was not permitted to accomplish the same result by creating a
statutory presumption which ... expose[d] him to conviction and punishment." Id. at 244. Reasoning that the
statute was an instrument for involuntary servitude, which is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Court declared it invalid. Id. at 243-45. In short, the Court declared that when a State cannot directly
transgress a constitutional prohibition, it is precluded from doing so indirectly. Id. at 239, 244.
81. Lebron 1, 710 F.3d at 1217.
82. Id. at 1217-18.
83. Id. at 1218.
84. Lebron v. Wilkins (Wilkins fl), 990 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1284 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1287.
88. Id. at 1292.
89. Id.
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doubt as to whether evidence of a drug use problem is alone sufficient to apply
the special needs doctrine, the district court pointed out that the State had not
demonstrated that such a problem exists among its TANF population.90 On the
contrary, the district court found that the only competent evidence-the results
of Florida's 1998 Demonstration Project and the data collected during the brief
implementation of section 414.0652-demonstrated that TANF applicants had a
lower rate of drug usage than Florida's population as a whole.9 1 Other evidence
supporting the existence of a drug use problem was offered by the State in the
form of expert and lay witness testimony, which the district court deemed
inadmissible or irrelevant.9 2 Determining that the record lacked any competent
evidence of a pervasive drug problem among TANF applicants, the district court
concluded, once again, that the State failed to establish a substantial special need
to justify mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants.93
Rejecting the State's alternative argument hat consent renders the drug
testing a reasonable search, the district court cited to the Eleventh Circuit's prior
opinion in Lebron I in determining that consent under the statute was not
voluntarily given.94  Ultimately, the district court granted final summary
judgment to Lebron, declaring section 414.0652 unconstitutional and
permanently enjoining the State from enforcing it.95
The State, once again, appealed the district court's decision to the Eleventh
Circuit.96 Nevertheless, a panel consisting of Judge Frank Hull,9 7 Judge Stanley
Marcus,9 8 and Judge Amy Totenberg99 affirmed the district court's judgment
declaring the mandated drug testing regime under section 414.0652 a violation
of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches.100
This long procedural history illustrates Florida's several failed attempts to
persuade the Eleventh Circuit that the Government's assumptions about TANF
applicants sufficiently established, as a matter of fact, that beneficiaries are
automatically deserving of suspicion sufficient to justify the Government's
treatment of them as if they are. The next Part discusses in detail the case
precedent the Eleventh Circuit relied upon to determine that the mandatory,
suspicionless drug testing urged by the Government was unconstitutional.
90. Id. at 1292-93.
91. Id. at 1293-94.
92. Id. at 1294. The evidence will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV of this Note.
93. Id. at 1298.
94. Id. at 1298-99.
95. Id. at 1299.
96. Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron 11), 772 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir.
2014).
97. Judge Hull was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals by President Bill Clinton on 1997.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, http://www.cal l.uscourts.gov/judges/hon-
frank-m-hull (last visited Feb. 19, 2015).
98. Judge Marcus was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals by President Bill Clinton in
1997. Id.
99. Judge Totenberg was appointed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia by President Barack Obama in 2011. JUDGEPEDIA, http://judgepedia.org/Amy Totenberg (last
visited Feb. 19, 2015).
100. Lebron II, 772 F.3d at 1378.
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
The criminalization of welfare recipients is not a new phenomenon, but a
result of historical notions and stereotypes about race and class in the United
States. After chronicling the public opinion of the poor from the inception of the
federal welfare system to modem day drug testing of TANF recipients, this Part
provides statistical data detailing the demographics of the beneficiaries of
TANF. Part III concludes by explaining the development of law regarding the
constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing-the main issue in the topic case.
A. How Did We Get Here: The Nation's Public Opinion History about Welfare
1. The Beginning View
Initial public perception about the character of the beneficiaries of state and
federal aid programs bears a sharp contrast to the prevailing view that we have
come to know today. Prior to the 1930s, the poor and elderly received no
assistance from the Federal Government.10 1 On the eve of the Great Depression,
this segment of the population could only look to family or local and state
governments for relief.102 Public welfare programs were instituted to provide
assistance to the deserving poor, "such as the blind, deaf, insane, . . . orphaned,"
and White widowed mothers. 103 These programs were often underfunded.104
But due to the massive unemployment and widespread suffering caused by the
Great Depression, the Federal Government was compelled to provide a national
framework for assisting the poor.105
Beginning with President Roosevelt's signing of the Social Security Act of
1935 ("the Act"), Aid to Dependent Children ("ADC") was instituted for the
purpose of assisting poor widowed mothers in the care of their dependent
children. 106 Being that the language of the Act "allowed the exclusion of
African Americans from [its] programs," 0 7 ADC was tailored to the White
widowed mother.108 Impoverished African American1 09 women and their
101. OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=68 (last visited Jan.
12, 2014).
102. Id.
103. Williams, supra note 5, at 721-22.
104. Id. at 721.
105. Id. at 722.
106. See Gustafson, supra note 4 (citing BARBARA J. NELSON, THE ORIGINS OF THE Two-CHANNEL
WELFARE STATE: WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND MOTHER'S AID, IN WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE
124 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990)) ("arguing that we should view 'the welfare state as fundamentally divided into
two channels, one originally designed for white industrial workers and the other designed for impoverished,
white, working-class widows with young children'). The text of the original Act stated that its purpose was to
"provide for the general welfare by establishing a system of Federal old-age benefits, and by enabling the
several States to make more adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled
children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of their unemployment
compensation laws .... " SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/35act.html ( ast visited Jan.
12, 2015) (quoting the Social Security Act of 1935).
107. Williams, supra note 5 at 722.
108. Id.
109. The terms "African American" and "Black" will be used interchangeably throughout the Note.
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children were largely omitted as beneficiaries of such programs.1 10
But from 1945-1960, the enrollment in ADC shifted to a growing number
of families of divorced or unmarried mothers.1 11  Yet the number of families
headed by widows decreased.112 At the same time, the number of African
American welfare recipients grew, partially due to the migration of indigent
African American families from the South to northern industrial cities in search
of jobs.113 Changes in agricultural production in the South following World
War II resulted in the unemployment of many African Americans, providing the
impetus for the Great Migration.114 Unfortunately, the combination of racial
discrimination and deindustrialization left an overwhelmingly vast amount of
African Americans unemployed after moving to the North.1 15
In the post-war period, the number of single mothers increased across all
racial demographics.116 The rate of children born out-of-wedlock was twenty-
three out of 1,000 for White women and 261 out of 1,000 for African American
women in 1960.117 This racial gap was partially attributed to the lack of
institutional resources available to African American women, such as
adoption.118 By 1961, African Americans comprised forty-eight percent of the
ADC rolls, as opposed to thirty-one perecent in 1950.119 Whites accounted for
forty-two percent of the ADC caseload.12 0 With these changes, many states
110. Gustafson, supra note 4; Nadasen, supra note 7; Williams, supra note 5 at 723-24.
111. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 648-49 (citing WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 208 n.24
(1965) and Jules H. Berman, Public Assistance Under the Social Security Act, 14 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 83,
88 (1960)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 649 (citing FRANCES Fox PIvEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 184-89 (updated ed. 1993)). Impoverished African American women were
considered employable in the South due to their long history of working outside of the household. Nadasen,
supra note 7 at 56-57. Because of a strong consensus that there were "more work opportunities for [African
American] women" and a "desire not to interfere with local labor conditions," these women were intentionally
denied eligibility for welfare in the South. Id.
114. Nadasen, supra note 7 at 56-57.
115. Id. at 57.
116. Id. (citing Robert Grove & Alice Hetzel, VITAL STATISTICS RATES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-
1960 185 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1968)). The rate of out-of-
wedlock births expanded "by 31% for white women and 20% for nonwhites" from 1950 to 1960. Id. "[B]y the
1960s, most welfare recipients were not widows but were never-married, divorced, or deserted women." Id.
Widows only constituted 7.7% of the ADC rolls by 1961, as opposed to 61% in 1939. Susan L. Thomas, Race,
Gender, and Welfare Reform: The Antinatalist Response, 28 JOURNAL OF BLACK STUDIES 419, 422 (1998).
117. Nadasen, supra note 7 at 57 (citing Robert Grove & Alice Hetzel, VITAL STATISTICS RATES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1940-1960 185 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
1968)).
118. Id. (citing Regina Kunzel, White Neurosis, Black Pathology: Constructing Out-of-Wedlock
Pregnancy in the Wartime and Post-War US, in NOT JUNE CLEAVER: WOMEN AND GENDER IN POSTWAR
AMERICA 304-31 (Joanne Meyerowitz ed., Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994) and RICKIE
SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE (New York:
Routledge, 1994)).
119. Nadasen, supra note 7 at 56 (citing U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee.
Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means,
1986 Edition. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986).
120. Roberta Wollons, "Dependent Children, " in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD IN
HISTORY AND SOCIETY (2004), http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3402800134.html (last visited Jan. 12,
2015). "Absolute numbers of white women were higher, but the percent of black women receiving ADC
benefits was higher than in the general population." Id.
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began arbitrarily enforcing more restrictive policies, such as "suitable home"
provisions and "man in the house" rules.12 1  Such policies allowed
administrators to deny assistance to women with illegitimate children and those
cohabitating with men.122 Regarded as morality standards,12 3 these provisions
typically functioned to eliminate African American women from ADC rolls.124
2. Birth of the Anecdotal "Welfare Queen"
Around the mid-1960s, poor Black women were being condemned for the
troubles of society, and the notorious Moynihan Report of 1965 inadvertently
perpetuated this view.12 5  Written by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, President
Johnson's Assistant Secretary of Labor, this report asserted that "[a]s a direct
result of [the] high rate of divorce, separation, and desertion, a very large percent
of Negro families are headed by females."1 2 6 According to the report, this
disintegration of the black family corresponded to the growing rate of ADC-
then, Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC")1 27-recipients.1 28
The report fueled the perception of the single Black mother as the source of
"poverty, joblessness, and crime"-ails of the inner cities.12 9
Subsequently, coining the term "welfare queen," California Governor
Ronald Reagan -later to become President-exploited this perception on his
platform for limited government.130 Throughout his campaign trail in 1976,
Reagan often told the inaccurate story of a Chicago woman living lavishly due to
her abuse of government dole:
She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards and is
collecting veterans' benefits on four non-existing deceased
husbands. And she's collecting Social Security on her cards.
She's got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting
welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income
121. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 649 (citing WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 76 (1965)).
122. Nadasen, supra note 7.
123. The morality of African American women has been attacked since slavery, during which they were
"characterized as 'Jezebels' who had loose morals and outsized sexual desires .... " Ann Cammett, Deadbeat
Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L & SOC. JUST. 233, 248 (2014). See
Paul Finkelman, Symposium, Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REv. 75, 102,104, 112 (1999) and Catherine R. Albiston & Lara Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other
Fairy Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 How. L.J. 473, 483-84 (1995),
for discussions of how the morality of African American women has been questioned throughout history.
124. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 649 (citing WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 76 (1965)).
125. Id. at 650 (referencing DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY:
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965)).
126. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR
NATIONAL ACTION 9 (1965), http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/moynchapter2.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2016).
127. Aid to Dependent Children became formally known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children in
1962. Williams, supra note 5 at 746 n.40.
128. Moynihan, supra note 127 at 12.
129. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 650; see MOYNIHAN, supra note 127 at 30.
130. See "Welfare Queen" Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, supra note 9.
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alone is over $150,000.131
The anecdotal "welfare queen" promoted an image of degeneracy and
corruption among poor women of color.132 Thus, concerns of welfare fraud and
cheating grew throughout the 1970s.133 During his presidential campaign,
Reagan employed the rhetoric of the "welfare queen" to personify his belief of
excessive spending and misappropriation of government funds in welfare
programs.134 After assuming presidency in 1980, Reagan directed the federal
government to reduce funding for government assistance programs, uch as food
stamps.13 5 During his re-election campaign, Reagan urged an attack on "waste,
fraud, and abuse" within the government.136 In practice, however, this attack
only targeted welfare fraud by recipients.13 7 Ridden with inaccuracies, Reagan's
anecdotal "welfare queen" was solidified as the public's stereotype of poor
Black mothers.13 8  Poor Black mothers became the image for welfare
beneficiaries, although White women still made up a large percentage of those
receiving welfare.139 Further, these Black mothers were criminalized as having
rich lifestyles by exploiting the welfare program. 140
3. Welfare Reform: An Introduction to TANF
In the 1990s, surveys demonstrated that public perception of welfare was
now a system that "rewarded laziness among African Americans."1 4 1 A new
terminology emerged-"welfare dependency."42  The system was then
reformed by Congress's enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA").14 3 This legislation
131. Cammett, supra note 124 at 244; "Welfare Queen" Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, supra note
9.
132. See Gilman, supra note 9 at 259-60.
133. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 654 (referencing Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 106-171, 114
Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 201-2036 (1977)). Disclosure of Social Security numbers are now
required to receive benefits. Id.
134. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 655 (citing Welfare Queen Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1976, at 51).
135. Steven V. Roberts, Food Stamp Trims Sought by Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1981, at A23.
136. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 656.
137. Id.
138. See Cammett, supra note 124 at 244-46.
139. See Mary Hawkesworth, Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender: Toward a Theory of Race-
Gendered Institutions, in 97 AM. POL. REV. 529, 542 (2003).
140. See Gilman, supra note 9 at 257, 259-60 (stating that the welfare queen stereotypes low income
women of color as individuals who live extravagant lifestyles by cheating taxpayers).
141. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 658 (citing Martin Gilens, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE,
MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 3 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1999)). A CBS/New York
Times poll revealed that 63% of the participants believed that the majority of welfare recipients were African
Americans due to a "lack of effort on their own part." Eric McBurney, So Long as Lawmakers Do Not Use the
N-Word: The Maximum Family Grant Example of How The Equal Protection Clause Protects Racially
Discriminatory Laws 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 497, 510 (2011).
142. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 658 (citing ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE
PUBLIC IDENTITY OF THE WELFARE QUEEN 93-94 (2004)).
143. Id. at 661 (citing Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42. U.S.C. § 7, 8, 21, 25 (2006)).
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created the TANF block program, replacing ADFC.1 4 4 The purpose of the
PRWORA was to give States flexibility in operating programs tailored to
achieve the following goals:
(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in
their own homes . .. ; (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government
benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual
numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies;
and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.14 5
Under the Act, States established their own eligibility requirements for
TANF applicants.14 6 Additionally, federal law granted States the power to test
recipients for illicit drug use and to sanction those who tested positive.14 7 But
Congress provided no direction on the manner in which States were permitted to
do so constitutionally.14 8 States reacted in a variety of ways, many of which
furthered the dehumanization and criminalization of poor, Black women.149
With this congressional grant of authority, Florida passed section 414.0652
on May 31, 2011, requiring all TANF applicants to submit to suspicionless,
mandatory drug testing as a condition to receiving aid.150 Although the focus of
this Note, Florida is not alone-twelve states, including Mississippi, have
currently enacted some form of TANF drug testing laws.15 1  And as of
November 5, 2014, at least eighteen more have made proposals for such
legislation.152 While this legislation seems driven by the preconceptions about
welfare beneficiaries, the next section takes a more realistic look at who are
factually the beneficiaries.
B. Who Are Factually the Beneficiaries?
The Administration for Children and Families ("ACF"), a division of the
144. Id. (citing § 402, 110 Stat. at 2113-15 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (2006)).





149. Many States considered legislation mandating suspicionless drug testing, which implies that the
poor are inherently criminal. Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and
the Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 751, 751 (2011). Some States proposed to
require drug testing based on reasonable suspicion. Abby E. Schaberg, State Drug Testing Requirements for
Welfare Recipients: Are Missouri and Florida's New Laws Constitutional?, 77 Mo. L. REV. 567, 567 (2012);
see also Candice T. Player, Public Assistance, Drug Testing, and the Law: The Limits of Population-Based
LegalAnalysis, 40 AM. J.L. & MED. 26, 27-28 (2014).
150. Wilkins 1, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
151. The following states have passed TANF drug testing legislation: Arizona, Florida, Missouri,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Georgia, Utah, North Carolina, Kansas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Michigan. Drug
Testing For Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 6,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/drug-testing-and-public-assistance.aspx. Under
Mississippi's law which took effect on July 1, 2014-all adult TANF applicants are required to submit to a
drug test as a condition of eligibility if the results of a screening questionnaire indicate a reasonable likelihood
of drug use. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-17-6(2)-(3) (1972).
152. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 149.
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U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,153 was tasked with
administering the TANF program.154 According to data compiled by ACF, the
nationwide total of families receiving TANF aid was 1,753,021 in 2012.155 Of
those families on TANF, 30.1% were White and 31.5% were African
American.156  Hispanic families comprised 31.1% of the nation's TANF
recipients. 157
In 2012, out of 1,009,349 adult TANF recipients,'5 8  868,863 were
womenl59 and only 143,486 were men.160  Further breakdown revealed that
25.7% of the total adult recipients were Hispanic, 34% were White, and 33.5%
were African American.16 1 While these statistics revealed that, as to gender, the
majority of TANF recipients are women, the beneficiaries of the program seem
to evenly encompass each of the three major racial demographics in the U.S.
This factual racial makeup is contrary to popular opinion, which depicts TANF
beneficiaries as almost entirely Black women.162
Notably, Luis Lebron is a contradiction of popular opinion in and of
himself As an honorably discharged veteran, full-time college student, caring
son to his disabled mother, and single father who fought to establish the
paternity of his young child,163 Lebron does not exactly fit the mold of society's
stereotype of the lazy, extravagant, depraved welfare queen,164 or of a sub-
human drug addict. But even though this stereotype of welfare beneficiaries
"has no basis in fact or science,"'65 it has spurred state legislatures to exempt the
needy from the constitutional protections guaranteed to everyone, even the
economically destitute, in the Fourth Amendment.166 All persons, even the
poor, are entitled to be protected from governmental intrusive searches unless
they are individually deserving of suspicion or the Government has urgent,
special needs. Government's suspicions cannot be based on unfounded
stereotypes.
153. What is the Administration for Children and Families, ADMIN FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
154. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
155. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HUMAN & HUMAN SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS





158. Id. at 25.
159. Id. at 24.
160. Id. at 23.
161. Id. at 25.
162. See Hawkesworth, supra note 140 at 542 (discussing how a congressional debate on welfare reform
in the mid-nineties revealed that many Congressmen "had the image of a welfare recipient as an urban black
woman, who irresponsibly had children, was lazy, refused to work, [and] was uneducated").
163. Kayanan, supra note 41.
164. See Gilman, supra note 9 at 247.
165. Kayanan, supra note 41.
166. See Budd, supra note 150.
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C. The Fourth Amendment's Requirement ofSuspicion and Its Exceptions
The Fourth Amendment expressly guarantees the rights of all individuals
"to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."1 67  Generally, a search conducted by governmental
officials is not deemed reasonable, and thus prohibited, unless grounded upon
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.168 In furtherance of this requirement, a
search typically must be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable
cause.169 The Fourth Amendment affords this protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures to all reasonable and legitimate privacy expectations.170
The reasonableness of a search is determined by weighing the necessity of the
search against its invasion into an individual's privacy.171
In spite of this broad constitutional protection from suspicionless searches,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized a narrow class of exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment's suspicion requirement where there is a showing of
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, which make the
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable." 7 2 This Part thoroughly
discusses the exceptional circumstances that the Court has determined fall within
this "closely guarded category" 73 justifying suspicionless drug testing, as
established in Skinner, Von Raab, Veronia, and Earls.174 Additionally, this Part
thoroughly examines the Court's Chandler opinion, which invalidated the
blanket drug testing of candidates for state public office and emphasized that the
proffered specials needs must be substantial.175
1. The Specific Risk to Public Safety by Employees Engaged in Inherently
Dangerous Activity
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association is an illustration of the
Court's recognition of the specific risk to public safety by employees engaged in
inherently dangerous jobs as an exceptional circumstance, constituting a
substantial special need that warrants exemption from the probable cause and
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.17 6 In Skinner, the Federal
Railroad Administration ("FRA") promulgated regulations mandating drug
testing of railroad employees involved in particular train accidents in light of
findings that alcohol and drug abuse contributed to a significant amount of train
accidents and fatalities.17 7 Subpart C of the regulations, entitled "Post-Accident
Toxicology Testing," mandated railroads to require all employees of the railroad
167. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
168. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308. (1997).
169. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs'. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
170. See N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985).
171. Id. at 337.
172. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
173. Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron 1), 710 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir.
2013).
174. Id.
175. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
176. 489 U.S. 602.
177. Id. at 606.
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directly involved in certain accidents to provide blood and urine samples for
toxicology testing.178 Individuals who refused to succumb to the required
toxicology testing were not allowed to perform covered services for a period of
nine months.179 Claiming the regulations were unconstitutional, the Railway
Labor Executives' Association filed a suit to enjoin the FRA's enforcement.180
The United States Supreme Court concluded the drug and alcohol testing
prescribed by the regulations constituted Fourth Amendment searches and
sought to resolve whether such searches were reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.181 The Court acknowledged certain circumstances warrant an
exception to the general probable cause and warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the . . . requirement impracticable." 82 When the existence of such special
needs are established, the Court noted it is then proper to balance the
governmental and privacy interests to determine whether adhering to the warrant
and probable cause requirement is practical under the circumstances.183 The
Court recognized the Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad
employees to guarantee safety qualifies as special needs because covered
employees are engaged in safety sensitive tasks.184
Since alcohol and other drugs are continuously eliminated from the
bloodstream, the Court observed that the obligation of obtaining a warrant would
cause a delay risking the loss of valuable evidence.185 The Court also noted that
imposing the burden of obtaining a warrant on private railroad supervisors, who
are unfamiliar with such procedures, would be unreasonable and further impede
the Government's objective.186  Thus, a warrant requirement would not
contribute to the certainty already provided by the regulations, but would simply
frustrate the Government's testing program.187 As a result, the Government's
interest in not requiring a warrant was at its strongest.188
The Court further articulated that when the search intrudes upon minimal
privacy interests and an important governmental interest would be placed in
jeopardy if a showing of individualized suspicion is required, a search may be
deemed reasonable without such suspicion.189 Within the context of railroad
employees, the Court reasoned that the expectations of privacy by covered
employees are diminished due to their engagement in an industry that is heavily
regulated in order to guarantee safety, which is dependent on the fitness of such
employees.190 Conversely, the Government's interest in conducting testing,
178. Id. at 609.
179. Id. at 610-11.
180. Id. at 612.
181. Id. at 616-19.
182. Id. at 619.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 620.
185. Id. at 623.
186. Id. at 623-24.
187. Id. at 624.
188. Id. at 623.
189. Id. at 624.
190. Id. at 627.
215
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
absent a requirement of individualized suspicion, was compelling since the
duties of the railroad employees are filled with "such risks of injury to others
that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences."'91
That is to say, due to the inherently dangerous nature of the employees' work,
these individuals can trigger events that result in vast fatalities before a
supervisor notices any signs of impairment.192  Being that employees are
informed that they will be tested if involved in certain specific, yet unpredictable
events, the Court determined the regulations effectively increased the deterrence
of employees from engaging in the prohibited conduct.193
As a result of the Court's balancing, it held the Government's interest
outweighed the established privacy concerns.194  Therefore, the toxicology
testing without individualized suspicion, as prescribed by the FRA's regulations,
was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.195
Along the same lines as those established by the Court in Skinner, it again
recognized the specific risk to public safety by employees engaged in inherently
dangerous jobs as an exceptional circumstance justifying departure from the
Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirement in National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,196-decided on the same day as
Skinner. The issue in Von Raab concerned the required urinalysis testing of
employees of the United States Customs Service who sought to be transferred or
promoted to certain positions.197 Because drug interdiction was the United
States Customs Service's primary enforcement mission, drug tests were rendered
a condition for employment in positions that satisfied any of the following
criteria: directly engaging in drug interdiction, carrying a firearm, or handling
classified material.198 Employees with positive test results were subject to
dismissal from the agency.199
Claiming the drug testing program violated the Fourth Amendment, a union
of federal employees and a union official filed suit on behalf of Customs
employees who sought to be placed in the covered positions.200 Looking to
Skinner, the Supreme Court noted that neither the requirement of a warrant,
probable cause, nor individualized suspicion is a necessary element of
191. Id. at 628.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 630. The Court rejected the lower court's contention that post-accident regulations are
unreasonable because blood and urine tests cannot quantify current drug intoxication or degree of impairment.
Id. at 631. It reasoned that the lower court's analysis was inconsistent with the premise that an inquiry must
only have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination . . . more..
. or less probable than it would be without the evidence" in order to be relevant. Id. at 631-32. Moreover, a
positive test result, in addition to established information regarding the process of elimination for a particular
drug and information pertaining to the employee's activities, facilitates the FRA in reaching an informed
judgment about how an accident occurred. Id. at 632.
194. Id. at 633.
195. Id. at 634.
196. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
197. Id. at 659.
198. Id. at 660-61.
199. Id. at 663.
200. Id.
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reasonableness in every situation.201 The Court articulated the exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirement where special needs, "beyond the
normal need for law enforcement," render such requirement impracticable as
stated in Skinner.202 It further reasoned that the drug testing program was not
created to serve the normal needs of law enforcement.203 This conclusion was
rendered because the purpose of the testing was to discourage drug use among
the individuals worthy of promotion to sensitive positions and to avoid
promoting drug users to those positions; its purpose was not for use in a criminal
prosecution.204  The Court then rationalized that requiring a warrant in
connection with "routine, yet sensitive, employment decisions" would
compromise the agency's mission.205 Additionally, it determined a warrant
would not contribute much to the protection of personal privacy, within this
context, since the agency does not make a discretionary determination to conduct
a drug test.206 This determination was based on the fact that the circumstances
warranting testing are narrowly defined since employees know that they will be
subjected to such testing only upon seeking placement in the covered
positions.207
The Court concluded that the Government's need to conduct such searches
outweighed the privacy interests of employees directly involved in drug
interdiction, as well as those who were required to carry guns.208  This
conclusion was grounded on the employees' exposure to the dangerous criminal
element of drug smuggling and controlled substances.209 Due to the inherent
dangers associated with the duties of employees directly involved in drug
interdiction and those required to carry firearms, there was a strong public
interest in preventing drug users from entering the positions in order to ensure
protection against risks to the employees, the nation, and the public.2 10 In light
of the need to be physically fit and exercise good judgment, the Court
determined the employees directly involved in the interdiction of drugs and those
required to carry firearms have a diminished expectation of privacy in respect to
the minimal intrusions accompanied by a urinalysis.2 11 As such, the Court
concluded that the infringement upon their privacy expectations did not
outweigh the Government's compelling interests.2 12
In doing so, the Court rejected the petitioners' following arguments: (1) the
program was not justified because its implementation was not based on a belief
that testing would disclose drug use by covered employees and (2) the program
201. Id. at 665.
202. Id. at 665-66.
203. Id. at 666.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 667.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 668.
209. Id. at 669.
210. Id. at 669-71.
211. Id. at 672.
212. Id.
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was not a "sufficiently productive mechanism to justify its intrusion upon Fourth
Amendment interest" since drug users can easily forgo detection.2 13 Regarding
the petitioners' first contention, the Court ecognized the program was designed
to "prevent the promotion of drug users to sensitive positions as much as it was
designed to detect those employees who used drugs."2 14  In light of the
extraordinary risks to public safety, the Government's deterrence policy could
not be deemed unreasonable.2 15 Further, the petitioners' second contention
overstated the case because employees cannot reasonably expect to avoid
detection by simply abstaining from drug use after the testing date is assigned.2 16
One could expect that attempts to taint the samples will succeed, in view of the
prophylactic measures taken by the sample collector to ensure the reliability of
the sample.2 17 In the end, the Court declared that the testing of employees who
are directly involved in drug interdiction and those required to carry firearms is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.2 18
In sum, the Court laid the groundwork for the special needs doctrine, which
recognizes exemptions to the Fourth Amendment's general requirement of
individualized suspicion where there are exceptional circumstances, in Skinner
and Von Rabb.2 19 The Skinner Court held the suspicionless drug testing
regulations that were implemented "in response to evidence [that] drug and
alcohol abuse by some railroad employees"2 20 was linked to train accidents was
justified because the significant interest in public safety.221 Acknowledging that
a requirement of establishing individualized suspicion after an accident could
lead to the loss of evidence, the Court determined that blanket drug testing was
necessary.222 For similar reasons, the Von Raab Court upheld the United States
Customs Service's policy of subjecting employees who were on the frontlines of
drug interdiction or carried a gun to supicionless drug testing.223 Such was
necessary, "[i]n light of the extraordinary safety and national security hazards
that would attend the promotion of drug users to [those] positions."224 The
Court's holdings in Skinner and Von Rabb qualified as interests in protecting
against the "specific risk to public safety by employees engaged in inherently
213. Id. at 672-76.
214. Id. at 674.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 676.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 677. The Court declined to offer a similar holding in respect to the program's coverage of
employees who are required to handle classified material due to ambiguities within the record. Id. at 677-78.
It was not clear whether the testing directive embodied only "those Custom employees likely to gain access to
sensitive information," because certain positions specified by the directive were potentially not likely to gain
access to such information. Id. at 678. This ambiguity rendered the Court unable to assess the reasonableness
of the testing program's coverage of such employees. Id. at 678-79. As a result, the Court remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals for clarification on the scope of this category. Id. at 678.
219. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602; (1989); Von Rabb, 489 U.S. 656.
220. Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron II), 772 F.3d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir.
2014).
221. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
222. Id. at 631.
223. Lebron , 772 F.3d at 1361.
224. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674.
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dangerous jobs" as a special need warranting exemption to the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of individualized suspicion.2 25  Outside of this
context, the Court has only accepted one other exception to this constitutional
protection.
2. The Protection of Children Entrusted to the Public School System's Care and
Tutelage
In 1995, the Court expanded its list of exceptional circumstances meriting
suspension of the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirement
to include the need to protect children entrusted to the public school system's
care and tutelage in Veronia School District 47J v. Acton.226 In the wake of
increased drug use among its students, Veronia School District 47J ("District")
implemented the Student Athlete Drug Policy. 227  Concerned that student
athletes were the leaders of the drug culture and that drug use increased the risk
of sports-related injury, the policy required all student athletes to individually
consent to drug testing, as well as obtain written consent from their parents.228
All athletes were tested at the beginning of their respective sport's season, and
10% of the athletes were randomly tested each week of the season.22 9 James
Actons, a seventh grader, was denied participation in the District's football
program because he and his parents refused to consent to the drug testing.230
Claiming that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment, the Actons sought
declaratory and injunctive relief from its enforcement.23 1
Beginning its inquiry into the reasonableness of the policy, the Court
focused its attention to the following subjects: "(1) children, who (2) have been
committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster."23 2 Because a
school's custodial and tutelary responsibility permits a certain degree of
supervision and control, the Court emphasized the diminished rights and
expectation of privacy of children within the school setting.233 The Court also
noted the privacy expectations enjoyed by student athletes are even less, given
the communal nature of school locker rooms.2 34 By choosing to participate in
interscholastic athletics, student athletes "voluntarily subject themselves to a
degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally."235
These heightened regulations included satisfying minimum grade requirements
and complying with dress codes, training hours, and rules of conduct.2 36 The
225. See Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron 1), 710 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th
Cir. 2013).
226. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
227. Id. at 648-50.
228. Id. at 649-50.
229. Id. at 650.
230. Id. at 651.
231. Id. The Actons also contended that the policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I,
section 9 of the Oregon Constitution.
232. Id. at 654.
233. Id. at 654-57.




MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Court likened this corresponding diminished expectation of privacy to that of
adults who are employed in a closely regulated industry.237
Turning then to the character of the intrusion at issue, the Court stated that
the privacy interests compromised by the procedure employed to collect the
urine samples was negligible, being that the conditions mimicked those typically
encountered in public restrooms.2 38 Furthermore, the urinalysis only tested for
drugs, not indications of pregnancy or health conditions.23 9 The test results were
only provided to a narrow class of school personnel on a "need to know" basis
and were not offered to law enforcement.240 The Actons argued, however, that
the policy involved a greater intrusion because it required students to identify
use of prescription medications prior to testing.241 Yet the Court concluded that
the intrusion on the privacy interests was insignificant, as nothing in the policy
contradicted the notion that the District permitted students to provide the
requested information in a confidential manner.242
Last, the Court considered the nature and immediacy of the governmental
interest and effectiveness of the means employed.243 Noting its characterization
of the Government's interests in Skinner and Von Raab as compelling, the Court
clarified that the state interest must be substantial, meaning "important enough
to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show the
search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy."244
Based on scientific proof that the severity of the "physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drug use" is at its extreme during school years, the Court
reasoned that the Government's interest in deterring drug use from
schoolchildren is compelling.24 5  And prevalent drug use among students
disrupts the educational process, affecting those students who do not use
drugs.2 46 Thus, the State had an obligation to act because it had undertaken the
responsibility of care and direction of the students.2 47 In addition, the Court's
reasoning embodied the concern for the safety of school athletes because the risk
of immediate physical harm caused by drug use is particularly high in the
context of sports.2 48
The Court did not question the validity of the district court's conclusion that
"a large segment of the student body, particularly those involved in
interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion . . . [of] epidemic
237. Id.
238. Id. at 658. Male students were required to produce urine samples while standing at a urinal fully
clothed and being observed only from behind; whereas, female students produced samples in an enclosed stall
while a female monitor listened outside. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 659.
242. Id. at 659-60.
243. Id. at 660.
244. Id. at 661.
245. Id.
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proportions" driven by drug use.249 The Court, however, stressed:
That is an immediate crisis of greater proportions than existed in
Skinner, where [the Court] upheld the Government's drug-
testing program based on findings of drug use by railroad
employees nationwide, without proof that a problem existed on
the particular railroads whose employees were subject to the
test. And of much greater proportions than existed in Von Raab,
where there was no documented history of drug use by customs
officials.2 50
As to the efficacy of the means employed to address the issue, the Actons
argued that suspicion based drug testing would be less intrusive.25 1 But the
Court rejected this contention, reasoning that implementation of a suspicion
based policy would be impracticable.252 In the Court's opinion, conducting drug
testing based on suspicion would convert the process into a "badge of shame."253
Further, a suspicion based policy risks teachers simply subjecting troublesome
students to drug testing, absent any indication of likely drug use.254 And it
imposes an obligation on teachers, who are ill prepared, to identify and bring to
account drug abuse.2 55  Such duty is not attuned with the occupation of
teaching.2 56 In light of the "decreased expectation of privacy, the relative
unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search,"
the Court held that the drug testing policy was reasonable and, thus,
constitutional.2 57
In 2002, in Board of Education v. Earls, the United States Supreme Court
extended its Veronia holding to drug testing of schoolchildren involved in all
extracurricular activities, as opposed to just athletics, in Board of Education v.
Earls.2 58  The Board of Education of Independent School District 92 of
Pottawatomie County ("School District") implemented the Student Activities
Drug Testing Policy, which made drug testing a requirement for all students who
participated in any extracurricular activities.2 59  The policy mandated all
students to submit to a drug test before participating in the activity and random
drug testing during the course of participation.2 60 Additionally, all students
participating in extracurricular activities had to consent to be tested at any time
based on reasonable suspicion.2 61 The respondents were two high school
249. Id. at 662-63.
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students, along with their parents, who sought participation in extracurricular
activities.262 Contending that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment, the
respondents filed a suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.2 63 They put
forth the contention that here was a lack of special need for testing students who
participate in extracurricular activities and that no drug problem had been proven
to exist.2 64
Addressing the respondents' argument that drug testing must be based on
individualized suspicion, the Court noted the "Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of individualized suspicion."2 65 It echoed the same
exception articulated by the Court in Skinner and Von Raab which applies "when
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable cause requirement impracticable."2 66  Acknowledging that it
previously held special needs exist in the public school setting, the Court applied
the principles of Veronia to resolve whether individualized suspicion was
necessary to test students involved in any extracurricular activities.2 67
Since the students engaged in nonathletic activities were not subjected to
regular physicals and communal undress, the respondents argued that these
students have a greater expectation of privacy than the student athletes in
Veronia.2 68 However, the Court characterized this distinction as insignificant
because the central focus of its Veronia decision was primarily the school's
custodial responsibility and authority.269 But the Court recognized students
involved in the extracurricular activities covered by the policy still subject
themselves to heightened regulations resulting in a further lessened expectation
of privacy comparable to that of student athletes.2 70
Moreover, the policy utilized the same method for obtaining urine samples
as employed in Veronia, except males were allowed to produce samples in an
enclosed stall.27 1  So the Court concluded that this method was even less
problematic than the already "negligible" intrusion at issue in Veronia.272
Further, all test results were required to be kept confidential and were only
disclosed to school personnel on a "need to know" basis.273 Law enforcement
was not provided with the tests results, nor were they used to impose disciplinary
consequences.274 The only consequence of testing positive was revocation of
the student's privilege to participate in extracurricular activities.2 75 In light of
the minimum intrusion associated with the sample collection and the narrow uses
262. Id.
263. Id. at 826-27.
264. Id. at 827.
265. Id. at 829 (quoting U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 831.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 831.
271. Id. at 832-33.
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of the test results, the Court concluded that the students suffered an insignificant
invasion to their privacy.276
In considering the nature and immediacy of the Government's concern and
efficacy of the means employed, the Court acknowledged that the compelling
interest in deterring schoolchildren from drug use had already been expressed
and accepted in Veronia.277 Noting that drug abuse among children had
increased since its 1995 decision, the Court still supported its contention that the
State had an obligation to act on behalf of the children under its care and
direction.278 Additionally, the School District provided direct proof of drug use
at the county's school:
Teachers testified that they had seen students who appeared to
be under the influence of drugs and that they had heard students
speaking openly about using drugs. A drug dog found
marijuana cigarettes near the school parking lot. Police officers
once found drugs or drug paraphernalia in a car driven by a
Future Farmers of America member.279
The Court rejected the respondents' claim that the proffered evidence did
not sufficiently establish that there is a "real and immediate interest" justifying
drug testing of nonathletes.280  In doing so, the Court recognized that "a
demonstrated problem of drug abuse is not in all cases necessary to the validity
of a testing regime, but that some showing does shore up an assertion of special
need for a suspicionless general search program."281 The Court concluded that
the evidence provided by the School District was sufficient to support a special
need for its drug testing policy.282 Moreover, the Court observed that it had not
required particularized or pervasive drug abuse before permitting the
Government to conduct suspicionless drug testing, as exemplified in Skinner and
Von Raab.283 And it further reasoned that the need to prevent and deter the
severe effects caused by childhood drug use offers the necessary immediacy for
a school drug testing program before a substantial portion of the students engage
in drug use.284 The Court concluded by holding that the policy of testing student
participants in extracurricular activities was a "reasonably effective means of
addressing the School District's legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring, and
detecting drug use."285 Moreover, the policy promoted the School District's
interest in guarding the students' safety and health.286
276. Id. at 834.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 834-35.
280. Id. at 835.
281. Id.
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283. Id. at 835-36.
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Briefly put, the Supreme Court primarily focused on the "school's custodial
responsibility and authority," in upholding the supicionless drug testing of
student athletes in Veronia and students involved in any extracurricular activity
in Earls.287  Giving due regard to the limitations placed on the Fourth
Amendment rights of children in a public school setting, the Court determined
that the schools had compelling interests in preventing the risks to health and
safety of the students by deterring drug use.28 8 With these two cases, the Court
recognized that "the protection of children entrusted to the public school
system's care and tutelage" constitutes a special need exception to the
requirement of individualized suspicion.2 89  But the Court has cautiously
declined to recognize any other circumstances as substantial enough to
circumvent the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment.
3. The Lack of a "Concrete Danger"
In 1997, the Court declined to recognize drug testing of state candidates as
a limited circumstance in which suspicionless searches are justified in Chandler
v. Miller.290 Chandler questioned the constitutional validity of Georgia Code
Annotated section 21-2-140, which required candidates for certain state offices
to prove that they had tested negative for illicit drugs.2 91 Under the statute,
candidates were required to provide a certificate from a state-approved
laboratory, documenting the candidate's submission to a urinalysis with negative
results as a precondition for qualification.292 Libertarian Party nominees for the
offices of Lieutenant Governor, Commissioner of Agriculture, and members of
the General Assembly filed an action challenging the Georgia statute as a
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.2 93  The petitioners sought
declaratory and injunctive relief.294
Reiterating fundamental Fourth Amendment principles, the Court
established that a search typically must be based on some level of individualized
suspicion in order to be reasonable.29 5 But the suspicion requirement warrants
suspension when special needs-concerns other than the interdiction of crime-
exist. 296 Where justification for suspicionless searches is based upon the
alleged existence of special needs, the opposing private and public interests must
be balanced to determine whether an individualized suspicion requirement would
be impracticable.29 7
Beginning its inquiry into the reasonableness of Georgia's drug testing
287. See id. at 831.
288. See id. at 834.
289. See Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron 1), 710 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th
Cir. 2013).
290. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
291. Id. at 308.
292. Id. at 309.
293. Id. at 310. The Petitioners also asserted violations to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 313.
296. Id. at 313-14.
297. Id. at 314.
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requirement, the Court examined its established precedent and reaffirmed
Skinner, Von Raab, and Veronia as the benchmark for assessing the
constitutionality of the statute.298 With this framework in mind, the Court noted
that the testing method utilized involved a minimal intrusion because the
candidate was permitted to produce the urine sample at his private physician's
office.299 Additionally, the test results were only given to the candidate, who
controlled further distribution of the report.300 Shifting focus to the required
certification, the Court acknowledged that "the proffered special need for drug
testing must be substantial-important enough to override the individual's
acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion."301 Georgia's
proffered special need failed to satisfy this requirement.302
Notably, the respondents failed to demonstrate any indication of a "concrete
danger" in their defense of the statute.303 The crux of their argument for
justification rested on the irreconcilability of drug abuse with occupying a high
state office.304 The respondents merely contended that the statute was necessary
"because the use of illegal drugs draws into question an official's judgment and
integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public functions, including antidrug law
enforcement efforts; and undermines public confidence and trust in elected
officials." 305 In fact, the respondents conceded that the statute was not enacted
in response to suspicion of drug abuse by state officials.306 And the record did
not suggest that the dangers asserted were anything more than conjecture.307
While the Court acknowledged that a demonstrated drug abuse problem is not
necessary to validate mandatory drug testing, it would bolster the argument that
such a regime is needed and proper.308 What is more, the Court reasoned that
Georgia's certification requirement was not well crafted to identify candidates
who abused drugs.309 This was so because the candidate was well aware of the
test date which could be scheduled by the candidate within 30 days prior to
qualification for placement on the ballot.3 10 This awareness could allow drug
abusers to abstain long enough to avoid detection.3 11
Essential to the State's argument was the Court's holding in Von Raab,
which upheld a drug testing regime for Customs Service officers in certain
298. Id. at 314-18. The Court rejected the respondents' argument that the State's sovereign power to
establish qualifications under the Tenth Amendment modifies the "special needs" analysis. Id.
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positions absent a demonstrated drug abuse problem.312 But the Court drew a
distinction between the two cases by stressing that the Customs employees were
'routinely exposed to the vast network of organized crime that is inextricably
tied to drug use"' and their primary mission was drug interdiction.313
Furthermore, the significant difference between the two drug testing programs
was that candidates for state office are persistently scrutinized by the public;
whereas, Customs employees are not subjected to normal day-to-day scrutiny on
the job.314
The Court concluded that the need for Georgia's drug testing regime was
symbolic, not "special."315 It reached this conclusion because there was no
evidence of a drug problem among the targeted individuals, state officials
ordinarily do not engage in "high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks," and the
certification requirement did not immediately assist interdiction efforts.316 The
statute only served to portray Georgia as a committed combatant against drug
abuse.317 The Court stated, "[I]f a need of the 'set a good example' genre were
sufficient to overwhelm a Fourth Amendment objection, then the care [the]
Court took to explain why the needs in Skinner, Von Raab, and Veronia ranked
as 'special"' were unnecessary.318 In the end, the Court admonished that since
there was no threat to public safety, "the Fourth Amendment preclude[d] the
suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged."319
IV. LEBRON V SECRETARY OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDRENAND FAMILIES
Following Federal District Court Judge Mary Scriven's final declaration
that Florida Statute section 414.0652 was unconstitutional, the State found itself
justifying Florida's suspicionless drug testing regime before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit once more. But with an understanding
of the prior case law, the Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the district
court's judgment, holding Florida's requirement of the mandatory, suspicionless
drug testing of TANF applicants as an unconstitutional violation of the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches.320 In doing so, the
Eleventh Circuit recognized that many of the legal principles noted in Lebron I
equally applied to the topic case, Lebron 11.321
Acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment generally requires
individualized suspicion in order for a search to be reasonable, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that an exception is warranted when "'special needs, beyond the
312. Id.
313. Id. at 321 (quoting Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 322.
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2014).
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normal need for law enforcement,"' exist.322 It observed that the precedent
established in Skinner, Von Raab, Veronia, Chandler, and Earls supports the
principle that "'the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial-
important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individualized suspicion."'323 The State's main argument centered around the,
quite bare, assertion that Florida has a special need to justify its suspicionless
drug testing regime for welfare beneficiaries.324
In applying the special needs doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
State's contention that TANF applicants have a reduced expectation of privacy
because they choose to expose themselves to heightened regulations.325
Distinguishing TANF applicants from "employees in dangerous vocations or
students subject to the parens patriae power of the state," the Eleventh Circuit
asserted that TANF applicants do not relinquish legitimate expectations of
privacy by applying for government assistance.326 Even if such was the case,
the State bore the burden of first establishing a substantial special need, which it
failed to meet.327
The State's arguments were essentially a repeat of its unpersuasive
arguments from the prior case, Lebron J328 The State maintained that he same
interests promoted in Lebron I-"'(1) ensuring TANF participants' job
readiness; (2) ensuring the TANF program meets its child-welfare and family-
stability goals; and (3) ensuring that public funds are used for their intended
purposes and not to undermine public health"'-constituted substantial special
needs that justify the suspicionless drug-testing policy. 329
The Eleventh Circuit, however, characterized these needs as general
concerns that are not specific to TANF applicants.330 For instance, the State
generally desires work-readiness for all of its citizens, not just the TANF
population.33 1 Similarly, drug use affects children in all families, but the State
does not and cannot assert the right to test all parents.332 And the State offered
no evidence otherwise showing that the harms from drug use faced by children
in TANF households differ from the general harms that children face in all
families that may be dealing with drug use.333 Likewise, the Circuit Court
reasoned that an interest in ensuring that government funds are expended wisely
is not specific to the TANF program, but is inherent to all public programs.334
Yet this interest does not entitle a State to mandate suspicionless drug testing of
322. Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997)).
323. Id. at 1362 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997)).
324. Id. at 1361.
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all beneficiaries of state funds.335
Further, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that drug testing is not vital to the
success of the TANF program.336 The State made no effort to estimate the
amount of TANF funds that are misused for the purchase of drugs, nor was any
evidence presented indicating that drug testing conserves a substantial amount of
funds that would be wasted on drugs.337 As stated by the Eleventh Circuit, "[a]
government concern that a wholly undefined, albeit a very small, share of a
program's expenditures will be squandered cannot easily fit within the closely
guarded category reserved for substantial special needs without exploding the
carefully cultivated doctrine."338 Nevertheless, the State contended that its
asserted interests qualify as special needs because there is a strong concern of
drug use among TANF applicants.339 But the State presented no competent
evidence to support this empirical claim.340 In the Eleventh Circuit's opinion,
there was no reason to assume, as a theoretical matter, that low-income persons
are intrinsically prone to drug use or have a greater propensity to use drugs than
the general population.341 Nor was the Eleventh Circuit provided with any
reason to perceive drug use by TANF applicants differently from the general
population's drug use.342 The panel of judges understood that "'[w]hile 'a
demonstrated problem of drug abuse, is not in all cases necessary to the validity
of a testing regime,' such evidence could 'clarify' and 'substantiate' the dangers
presented by such drug use and whether those dangers were pertinent to the
government's asserted special need for drug testing."'
343
Remarkably, as pointed out by the Eleventh Circuit, the only competent
evidence suggested that TANF recipients do not abuse drugs at a greater rate
than the general public.344 This competent evidence that refuted the State's case
had been generated, interestingly, by the Government of Florida itself.345 Before
Florida enacted section 414.0652, the State conducted a study designed to assess
whether TANF applicants had a tendency to abuse illicit drugs and whether such
abuse hindered employment opportunities.346  Labeled the Demonstration
Project, the study began on January 1, 1999, and ended on May 31, 2000.347
Under the Demonstration Project, TANF applicants were given a screening
questionnaire to determine the likelihood that the applicant abused rugs.348 if
the screening instrument indicated that the applicant likely abused drugs, then
335. Id. at 1364-65.
336. Id. at 1364.
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the individual was subjected to a drug test.349 Out of the 8,797 individuals
initially screened, 2,335 failed to complete the application, which was consistent
"with the historical data on 'non-application completers."'350 The results of the
initial screening instrument led to required drug testing of 1,447 of the remaining
6,462 applicants.351 Of those 1,447 individuals, only 335 tested positive for
drugs.352 Hence, only 5.2% of the individuals who completed the application
process were proven to use drugs.353 Additionally, the study did not reveal that
the TANF recipients who use drugs were less likely to become employed than
those who tested negative.354
In line with the data collected under the Demonstration Project, only 2.6%
of the TANF applicants who were tested during the brief enforcement of section
414.0652 tested positive for illicit drug use-"108 out of 4,046."355 The State
argued that this figure was inaccurate because thousands of applicants did not
complete the application process nor submit to testing.356 Because the State did
not provide a mechanism for determining how many applications were not
completed because of drug use as opposed to other deterrent factors, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument.357  Additionally, as noted by the
Demonstration Project, historical data demonstrates that a significant number of
applicants neglected to complete applications even in the absence of a drug test
requirement.358 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that this data did not help
the State establish a substantial special need.359
Still asserting its concern of drug use within the TANF population, the State
argued that the district court erred by not admitting the testimony of expert and
lay witnesses regarding its prevalence.360 Expert witness Dr. Avram Mack, a
psychiatrist and professor who practiced "in areas of drug use and related
disorders," testified that drug use is more pervasive among TANF applicants and
recipients than among the general population.361 Dr. Mack's opinion, however,
was solely based on the research of others, as he had never conducted any
research of his own regarding the rate of drug abuse among any particular
population.362 Further, Dr. Mack did not have any experience "in studying the
rates of drug use in any demographic group."363 As noted by the Eleventh
Circuit, Dr. Mack also did not have a background in social science or statistics;
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among the TANF population.3 64 Moreover, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to admit the underlying articles on which Dr. Mack based
his opinion because the r liability of the articles could not be readily determined
without the assistance of an expert.36 5
Further, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's decision to not
admit the testimony of the three lay witnesses.3 66 Two employees of DCF,
Michael Carroll and Peter Digre, stated that they had observed firsthand the ills
of drug use within the TANF population, as well as the effects of drug use on
employment.36 7 Carroll also testified that he had personally witnessed hundreds
of TANF applicants who were intoxicated from drugs and that TANF recipients
are more susceptible to drug use than the beneficiaries of other government
benefits.36 8 According to the Eleventh Circuit, the statements of Carroll and
Digre crossed the line into the realm of expert opinion.369 Yet neither of the two
possessed training in identifying signs of drug use nor were they qualified to
speak on these grounds.370 Additional testimony was offered from Bruce
Ferguson, who stated that his job duties entailed referring recipients of public
assistance to substance abuse facilities and that he observed forty-two clients
who disclosed their use of alcohol or drugs within a ninety-day period.371
However, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that his testimony was not relevant to
the TANF program because it did not identify which government program in
which the clients participated or whether the clients specifically admitted to a
problem with drug abuse, and not alcohol.3 72 Thus, it did not help the State
demonstrate a substantial special need to support the supicionless drug testing of
TANF applicants.37 3
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the drug-testing regime had
little deterrent effect on "applicants whose drug use will affect employability,
endanger children, or drain public funds."3 74 This was so because TANF
applicants were required to take a drug test within ten days of being informed of
eligibility under the program, but applicants controlled when the application is
submitted.3 75 Thus, individuals could abstain from drug use for a period
sufficient enough to pass the test.376
In the alternative, the State argued that the consent of TANF applicants
rendered the search reasonable, even in the absence of special needs.377
Following the case law established in Lebron I, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this
364. Id.
365. Id. at 1370.
366. Id. at 1371.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1372.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1371.
372. Id. at 1373.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1374.
375. Id.
376. Id. (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 320 (1997)).
377. Id.
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argument because the consent was only "'granted in submission to authority
rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional
right."' 3 78 Also, the State's mandated consent was still contrary to the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, which provides that the Government "'may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests."'3 79 The Eleventh Circuit also reasoned that the special needs analysis
"accounts for whether consent reduces an individual's legitimate expectation of
privacy."38 0 Thus, consent should not be treated as a separate inquiry.3 81 As
demonstrated by the analysis in Skinner, Von Raab, Veronia, Chandler, and
Earls, "'the Supreme Court has never held that [suspicionless] drug testing
regimes were constitutionally reasonable because of consent."'
382
Ultimately because the State failed to establish the existence of substantial
special needs, the Eleventh Circuit held Florida's suspicionless drug testing of
TANF applicants as a condition for receiving benefits violated the Fourth
Amendment.3 83 While the writer agrees with the Eleventh Circuit's holding, the
analysis below will go a step further by asserting that the State's argument is
grounded in stereotypes which have been used throughout history to create bias
against the poor.
V. ANALYSIS
Having gained an understanding of the central issue in the topic case, as
well as the function that notions of race and class have played in the
development of the federal welfare system, the Analysis will now address the
issues that underlie Florida's enactment of section 414.0652-those of which the
Circuit Court failed to tackle. This Part will examine the State's refusal to
accept that no special needs exist to justify supicionless drug testing of TANF
applicants, in addition to the implications that Florida's drug testing policy has
on the rights of the poor. The writer challenges Florida to end its devotion to a
system of antiquated typecasts and urges the courts to directly address the effects
that such stereotypes have had on the development of the welfare system and its
beneficiaries.
A. The State's Refusal to Accept that No Special Needs Exist
In Lebron II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
declared Florida's suspicionless drug testing regime under Florida Statute
section 414.0652 a violation to the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit-for the second time-
announced that the State had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the
existence of substantial special needs to justify its departure from the Fourth
378. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948)).
379. Id. at 1374-75 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
380. Id. at 1377.
381. Id. at 1376.
382. Id. at 1377 (quoting Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families, (Lebron 1), 710 F.3d
1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2013)).
383. Id. at 1378.
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Amendment's requirement of individualized suspicion. But from the inception
of Luis Lebron's challenge to Florida's suspicionless drug testing of TANF
applicants, the State has zealously maintained that such special needs do exist
which support limiting the constitutional rights of the TANF population. The
State has been steadfast in claiming that the following interests constitute
substantial special needs justifying the suspicionless, mandatory drug testing
regime: "(1) ensuring TANF participants job readiness; (2) ensuring the TANF
program meets it child-welfare and family-stability goals; and (3) ensuring that
public funds are used for their intended purposes and not to undermine public
health."384
Yet underlying each of the asserted "special needs" is the inherent
presumption that drug use is prevalent among the TANF population.3 85 The
writer uses the term "presumption" because the State, as stressed by the Eleventh
Circuit, has continuously failed to provide any competent empirical evidence to
support its claim that concerns of drug use "are particularly strong for TANF
applicants."386 In fact, it has taken a less logical approach and decided to ignore
the factual data that stands in direct opposition to such an unfounded claim.387
Indeed, one does not have to search far to find that no such drug use problem
exists among Florida's TANF population-the State's own pilot study
established this absence.3 88
In 1998, Florida's Legislature ordered the State's DCF to conduct the
Demonstration Project for the sole purpose of evaluating the "'impact of [a]
drug-screening and drug-testing program on employability, job placement, job
retention, and salary levels of program participants and to make
'recommendations . . . as to the feasibility of expanding the program.' 389 To
fulfill this purpose, the Demonstration Project was aimed at testing (1) whether
Florida's TANF applicants were prone to illicit drug use and (2) whether such
abuse adversely impacts employment opportunities.390 But as the Eleventh
Circuit meticulously noted, 76.6% of 6,462 applicants screened by the written
questionnaire did not indicate a likelihood of drug use.3 9 1 Of the 1,447 who
were required to submit to a drug test, only 335 failed.39 2 That is to say, only
5.2% of the TANF applicants tested positive for illicit drug use between 1999
and 2001, the period in which the Demonstration Project was conducted.393
What is more, these results revealed the rate of drug use among TANF applicants
was significantly lower than the drug use rate of 8.13% among Florida's
384. Id. at 1364 (quoting Lebron v. Wilkins (Wilkins fl), 990 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2013)).
385. See id. at 1365.
386. Id.
387. See id. at 1366 ("If anything, the evidence extant suggests quite the opposite: that rates of drug use
in the TANF population are no greater than for those who receive other governmental benefits, or even for the
general public.").
388. See Kayanan, supra note 41.
389. Lebron v. Wilkins (Wilkins 1), 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 at 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing FLA. STAT. §
§ 414.709(1)-(5) (1998) (repealed 2004)).
390. Id. at 1277.
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population as a whole.39 4 Furthermore, the study did not suggest that there was
any difference in prospective employment between those who tested positive for
drug use and those who tested negative.395
Confounded by these findings, the researchers administering the
Demonstration Project concluded that because of the difficulty in establishing
the amount of drug use among welfare recipients, any test employed would only
provide an estimate.396 "'Such estimates are suitable only for planning purposes
and not for sanctioning."'397  Because the results of the study showed
insignificant differences in employment and income, as well as the fact that the
costs of drug testing outweighed its benefits, the researchers recommended that
Florida's Legislature not expand the testing program.398 Still, as Federal District
Court Judge Scriven so powerfully expressed:
[d]espite the failure of the Demonstration Project to uncover
evidence of rampant drug abuse among TANF applicants;
despite the conclusion of researchers that drug use did not
adversely impact any of the goals of the TANF program,
including employability, earning capacity or independence from
social assistance; despite the fact that the study revealed no
financial efficacy; despite the legal ramifications; and, despite
the express recommendation that the project not be continued or
expand, Florida enacted section 414.0652 ... .399
Nevertheless, the preliminary findings of the testing conducted pursuant to
section 414.0652 still evidenced a significantly low rate of drug use-only
2.67% of 4,046 TANF applicants who underwent urinalyses tested positive for
drugs.400 Yet notwithstanding the overwhelming amount of evidence to the
contrary, the State continues to argue that its broad interests qualify as special
needs because of the existence of a peculiar drug use problem among its TANF
applicants.401 The State is even willing to waste more of its taxpayers' dollars,
which it sought to protect by enacting the statute, by carrying out this witch hunt
than would be spent by paying benefits to the marginal number of those who fail
the test.402 Why? Well the Circuit Court's careful analysis did not provide an
answer. But the writer posits that the State cannot find competent evidence
394. Wilkins 1, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
395. Lebron II, 772 F.3d at 1366-67.
396. Wilkins 1, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
397. Id. (quoting Robert E. Crew, Jr. and Belinda Creel Davis, Assessing the Effects of Substance Abuse
Among Applicants for TANF Benefits, 17(1) J. HEALTH & SOC. POL'Y. 39, 52 (2003)).
398. Id.
399. Id. at 1279.
400. Lebron II, 772 F.3d at 1368.
401. See id. at 1365-67.
402. See Lizette Alvarez, No Savings Are Found from Welfare Drug Tests, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2012,
at A14, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/us/no-savings-found-in-florida-welfare-drug-tests.html. The State
expended $118,140 in reimbursements to all of the TANF applicants who were required to pay for, but passed,
the mandated drug testing during the enforcement of section 414.0652. Id. This equated to $45,780 more than
the amount that would have been paid in benefits to the mere 108 individuals who failed the test. Id.
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supporting its position, nor will it accept the evidence opposing its position,
because the State's proffered "special needs" justifying the drug testing of TANF
applicants are founded on stereotypes.
1. The State's "Special Needs" Seem to be Based on Stereotypes
The criminalization of the poor due to society's perception of the needy as a
class of depraved and degenerate sub-humans is not novel.40 3 Tracking the
development of the federal welfare system unfortunately reveals that our nation
has had a history of blaming the poor since the ADC rolls shifted to include a
greater representation of African American women in the 1960s.40 4 From
accusations of immorality and welfare fraud to accusations that taxpayers'
dollars are being wasted on drug use, the underlying tone of welfare reform
debates has always been the same.40 5  That is to say, evidence of such
allegations is not needed in order for them to be accepted as true. Only now, the
dehumanization is no longer carried out through midnight raids aimed at finding
men in the houses of immoral and undeserving impoverished women.40 6 It is
subtly endorsed through the mandatory drug testing of TANF applicants.
Since the 1960s, conservative policymakers have used stigmatizing
language when describing the poor in order to shape the public's view on
government funding for welfare programs.4 07 Though the language has been
altered, there is no difference between Reagan's use of the term "welfare
queen"408 and Governor Scott's employment of "drug addict."409 Both terms
are used as propaganda by politicians to depict the poor in a light that encourages
less government spending. Further, both are plagued with inaccuracies, but
accepted as true.
For instance, it is well known that Reagan embellished his tale of the
Chicago welfare queen he popularized as the face of all poor people: "She has 80
names, 30 addresses, 12 Social Security cards .... She's got Medicaid, getting
food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free
cash income alone is over $150,000."410 Truth revealed that Linda Taylor-the
woman on which Reagan's story was based-was only charged with using four
403. See generally Gustafson, supra note 4.
404. See Nadasen, supra note 7 at 55-56; Gustafson, supra note 4 at 648-49.
405. See, for example, Hawkesworth, supra note 140, for a discussion of how the majority of Congress
ignored the empirical evidence dispelling welfare myths during congressional debates regarding PRWORA in
the mid-90s. "In the words of [Michigan] Representative Barbara Collins. . ., 'The Congress unfortunately had
the image of a welfare recipient as an urban black woman, who irresponsibly had children, was lazy, refused to
work, [and] was uneducated."' Hawkesworth, supra note 140 at 542.
406. In the 1960s welfare offices raided the homes of women on the ADC rolls with the intent of finding
men in the beds of unmarried women. Gustafson, supra note 4 at 6495. Single women cohabitating with men
were "deemed unmorally unfit and their households therefore unsuitable for assistance." Id.
407. Cammett, supra note 121 at 233.
408. See "Welfare Queen" Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, " supra note 9.
409. After signing the bill proposing suspicionless drug testing of Florida TANF applicants into law,
Governor Scott stated that it is "unfair for Florida taxpayers to subsidize drug addiction." CNN Wire Staff,
Florida Governor Signs Welfare Drug-Screen Measure, CNN (June 1, 2011 5:58 A.M.),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/06/01/florida.welfare.drug.testing/index.html.
410. "Welfare Queen" Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, supra note 9.
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aliases and receiving $8,000 in welfare fraud.411 By the same token, Florida's
Legislature enacted, and gained support for, section 414.0652 based on its claim
of prevalent drug use among Florida's TANF applicants, despite the fact of
existing evidence to the contrary.412 By no means does the writer mean to
suggest that misuse of government assistance does not occur, only that such
isolated instances do not typify beneficiaries of government aid. But because
these stigmas fit the narrative, it does not matter that they are untrue for almost
all welfare beneficiaries.413
According to Madeleine Burbank, a white woman who was compelled to
seek government assistance after her marriage failed in the 1970s, "Reagan's
story validated some of the worst assumptions some Americans have about poor
people."4 14 For example, Reagan did not explicitly assign a race to the welfare
queen, but he often described "her" as "driving a pink Cadillac to cash her
welfare checks at the liquor store."415 Such rhetorical clues played upon ideas
that many White Americans had about African Americans within the inner
cities.4 16 Hence, "she" was universally understood to be African American.417
This was a clever ploy since the public consensus was that African American
women plagued the welfare rolls, even though White women were still the
majority. Thus, the effect of the "welfare queen" was that it made society feel
that the majority of welfare recipients were undeserving of government
assistance.418
As phrased by poverty expert Mark R. Rank,419 "[flew topics in American
society have more myths and stereotypes surrounding them than poverty,
misconceptions that distort both our politics and our domestic policy
making."420  Florida's mandated drug testing is directly derived from
misconceptions and stereotypes about the poor. As the Circuit Court noted,
"[w]ithout an obvious and palpable danger, the State [made] an empirical claim
that a drug-use problem exists among Florida TANF applicants."421 The
existence of such problem was the State's sole basis for enacting section
414.0652.
411. Id.
412. See Lebron v. Wilkins (Wilkins 1), 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1277-79 (M.D. Fla. 2011). After the
Demonstration Project ended, Florida's Legislature was not presented with any new data nor conducted any
new studies on Florida's welfare population prior to enacting section 414.0652. Id. at 1278-79.






418. See Cammett, supra note 124 at 245 ("By implying that committing acts of fraud was part of the
character of the Welfare Queen trope, Reagan reinforced the underserving status of the recipient.").
419. Mark R. Rank is a professor of Social Welfare at Washington University in St. Louis and one the
country's most renowned scholars on issues of poverty. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. Louis,
http://cgiu.wustl.edu/profiles/poverty-alleviation/mark-r-rank/ (last visited on January 23, 2014).
420. Mark R. Rank, Poverty in America is Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, November 3, 2013, at SR12,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/02/poverty-in-america-is-mainstream/?_r=0.
421. Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. of Dep't of Children and Families (Lebron II), 772 F.3d 1352, 1365 (11th
Cir. 2014).
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This leads one to wonder how the State can make this assertion when its
own study, which was specifically commissioned for the purpose of determining
whether a drug use problem existed among TANF applicants, countered this
claim. Based on this nation's history with the welfare system and the substantial
lack of supporting evidence, it is only reasonable to conclude that the State's
innate suspicion towards the poor is the result of, as well as a play on,
stereotypes embedded deep within society. By implying that TANF applicants
are inherently prone to drug use, the State reinforces the view that the needy are
comprised of those who are undeserving; thus, encouraging less government
funding for antipoverty programs. It is a move that has been played many times
throughout the history of federal welfare reform. There is nothing novel about it.
2. Discrediting the Myths
It is time for politicians to stop painting a dehumanizing and undeserving
image of the poor in an effort to block more meaningful discussions about
poverty in the U.S. "Demonizing welfare allows the country to ignore the
economic and social conditions that produce poverty and inequality-class, race,
gender, the economy, and inadequacies of the low-wage labor market."422 But
the criminalization of the needy will not end until society recognizes that the
poor are not a small subclass of lazy, corrupt individuals to be viewed with an
eye towards suspicion. Certainly, Luis Lebron-a Navy veteran, full-time
college student, single father, and caregiver to his disabled mother423-does not
fit the dehumanizing view that has been imposed on the needy. But while he
does not conform to the welfare queen and drug addict stereotypes, he does fit
the reality of many.
Based on the poverty thresholds issued by U.S. Census Bureau in 2012, the
research of poverty scholar Mark R. Rank revealed that roughly forty percent of
Americans within the age group of twenty-five to sixty will live below the
official poverty line-which was "$23,492 for a family of four"-for a period of
at least one year.424 An additional fifty-four percent will live in or near poverty
for one year.425 Moreover, four out of five Americans will resort to welfare aid,
experience near-poverty, or encounter unemployment at some point.426
Contrary to the popular image of poverty within the inner cities, individuals
residing in urban neighborhoods only comprised about ten percent of the
population living below the poverty line in 2012.427 Furthermore, Whites
accounted for two-thirds of those living below the poverty line, dispelling the
myth that poverty only affects people of color.428 Remarkably, these figures
reveal that the majority of Americans, even those who are hardworking, will
experience poverty at some point in life.429
422. Gilman, supra note 9 at 264.
423. Kayanan, supra note 41.
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B. The Implications ofMandatory, Suspicionless Drug Testing of TANF
Applicants
So while it may be difficult for society to value the constitutional rights of
welfare queens and drug addicts who abuse government aid, the facts reveal that
suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants is not infringing on the rights of
such stereotypical individuals. Rather, by enacting these laws, the Government
is infringing on the rights of everyday law-abiding citizens who seek assistance
during a year or two of economic hardship.4 30 Unfortunately, the individuals
who continue to support Florida Statute section 414.0652 are very resistant to the
facts.
Supporters of the law continue to argue for its justification on a basis that
would be less accepted if imposed on the more affluent. In response to the low
rate of drug use indicated by the data collected during the four months of the
statute's enforcement, Chris Cinquemani431 stated that "[t]he drug testing law
was really meant to make sure that the kids were protected. . . that our money
wasn't going to addicts." Along these same lines, State Representative Jimmie
T. Smith said, "[w]e had to stop allowing tax dollars for anybody to buy drugs
with." 432
But ensuring that not a single drug user inadvertently benefits from
taxpayers' dollars does not constitute a substantial special need that warrants
abrogating the Fourth Amendment rights of all TANF applicants. As the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned in Lebron I, this argument is akin to the symbolic
interest advanced by Georgia in Chandler, which the Supreme Court refused to
regard as a special need.433 Being that the State has failed to demonstrate that
that a concrete danger of drug use among TANF applicants exists, these
concerns are merely hypothetical and not real. Thus, all that is left is the image
that that the State wishes to put forth-that it is committed to ensuring that
taxpayer's dollars are not used to subsidize drug use. But "if a need of the 'set a
good example' genre were sufficient to overwhelm a Fourth Amendment
objection, then the care [the Supreme Court] took to explain why the needs in
Skinner, Von Raab, and Veronia ranked as 'special' wasted many words ... .434
In the end, the supporters of Florida's mandated drug testing of TANF applicants
seek to reduce the constitutional rights of the nation's most vulnerable-the
poor-for a symbol's sake.
C. What Steps Should be Taken?
Although the Eleventh Circuit properly rejected Florida's unfounded
arguments, it failed to recognize and explicitly address the stereotypes and sad
430. See id. ("[W]hile poverty strikes a majority of the population, the average time most people spend in
poverty is relatively short.").
431. Chris Cinquemani is the vice president of the Foundation for Government Accountability, which is
a public policy group within Florida that supports section 414.0652. Alvarez, supra note 403.
432. Id.
433. See Lebron v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of Children and Families, (Lebron 1), 710 F.3d 1210, 1211 (11th
Cir. 2013).
434. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997).
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history underlying the State's assertions. In fact, the majority stated that "[w]e
do not foreclose (nor could we) the possibility that government could establish a
special need if a voluntary benefits program as a whole would be rendered
ineffective without suspicionless searches."43 5 But while such may be possible,
it is not the reality in the case of Florida's mandatory, suspicionless drug testing
of TANF applicants. By making this statement, and at the same time failing to
address the effects that factually inaccurate stereotyping has on the development
of our laws, the Eleventh Circuit potentially invites Florida and other States to
better craft their arguments for infringing upon the rights of the poor. In
declaring Florida Statute section 414.0652 unconstitutional, the Eleventh Circuit
based its holding solely on the State's failure to present evidence of the existence
of special needs justifying its departure from the Fourth Amendment's
requirements. But it is not simply a matter of the State's failure to present
evidence of a pervasive drug problem among TANF recipients. As established
by the data collected under the Demonstration Project and during the
enforcement of section 414.0652, such evidence simply does not exist.
Florida, and other state governments, will not end their attempts to limit the
constitutional rights of the poor until the courts forthrightly state that the
proffered special needs for enforcing suspicionless drug testing of TANF
applicants are based on biased stereotypes as opposed to factual data. Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit should have taken its analysis further and condemned the
State's reliance on unfounded and inaccurate typecasting as method of
perpetuating bias against the poor. But since the Eleventh Circuit failed to do so,
the writer urges the United States Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of the
Constitution, to grant certiorari and unapologetically address the truth of the
matter. The nation's poor will not fully appreciate the constitutional protections
of the Fourth Amendment until the Court chooses to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment serves to protect the privacy and dignity of all
American citizens by generally precluding the Government from conducting
searches absent individualized suspicion. But the enactment of Florida Statute
section 414.0652 stands in direct opposition to the Fourth Amendment's
protections. Despite the overwhelming amount of evidence to the contrary,
Florida supports its mandated drug testing policy on the assumption of prevalent
drug use among TANF applicants. The State's innate suspicion of this targeted
group is not supported by the existence of substantial special needs that warrant
exempting the Fourth Amendment's constitutional guarantees. Instead, it is
rooted in this nation's dark history of demonizing the needy and treating them as
a subclass. Such ploys have long been used by politicians in order to confuse the
truth about poverty in this country. However, at a time when poverty is on the
rise, suspicionless drug testing laws based on inaccurate statistics and
misconceptions deter many from seeking help.
The Eleventh Circuit took the correct step in refuting the State's innuendos
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about the poor and calling them what they are-evidentiary lacking arguments.
This writer, however, feels that the Eleventh Circuit, and all courts, must go
further in bringing an end to governmental attempts to reduce the Fourth
Amendment rights of the poor by explicitly addressing the Government's
devotion to antiquated stereotypes. The poor, or welfare beneficiaries, are not
stereotypes contrived from racial and gender biases of policy makers. The poor
are not helpless, needy White mothers; they are not Black welfare queens; and,
they are not drug addicted sub-humans. They are, or could be, any one of us.
They are all colors, mothers and fathers. Some are veterans. Some are college
students. And some are caregivers for ailing parents. The poor are many
different people; but mainly, they are persons, just like Luis Lebron, deserving of
constitutional protections from governmental invasions based solely on
stereotypes.
